IMF Greece Report Was Flawed. EU Did Even Worse.

By Simon Johnson

In an internal report released this week on its involvement in Greece in the past few years, the International Monetary Fund takes on the European authorities much more bluntly than usual. Greece came to the IMF in 2010 later than it should have and needing more resources than could readily be provided -- primarily because of foot-dragging by its euro-partners. The Western Europeans also resisted Greek debt restructuring for far too long, creating a major handicap for the rescue program.

All of this is undeniable, but also relatively easy for the Europeans to dismiss. And dismissiveness was exactly the reaction from Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, and from the European Commission. Their line is: Mistakes were made, and now we are on the road to recovery -- so why worry?

In fact, the IMF staff fully understands -- but cannot speak openly about -- a deeper and more serious weakness in the euro area that threatens not just Greece but all of peripheral Europe today. European banks are woefully undercapitalized -- meaning they operate with very thin cushions of equity financing (and therefore fund their balance sheets with 95 percent or 97 percent debt). As a result, they have only a very limited ability to absorb losses, creating the potential for insolvency to spread throughout their financial system -- and around the world -- in unpredictable ways.

The Europeans live in fear of encountering their own Lehman Brothers moment, when a relatively moderate fall in debt values triggers widespread panic and another round of collapse in the real economy.

For this reason, when a significant debt restructuring was first proposed for Greece, the financial elite of the euro area was united in their opposition. German and French officials were among those most worried by what could happen if Greece defaulted or even had an orderly restructuring.

The American financial system is no picnic, with our Dodd-Frank financial reforms substantially stalled by Wall Street lobbying, but even our worst-run big banks are in much better shape than most of their European counterparts. Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas and Credit Agricole routinely operate with $50 billion to $100 billion in equity capital, with balance sheets in excess of $2.5 trillion. Risk has been mismanaged within those institutions and by their regulators. Deutsche Bank, the worst of a bad bunch, is frequently referred to by market participants as a very large hedge fund. It is not meant as a compliment.

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Hey, Germany: You Got a Bailout, Too

By the Editors May 24, 2012 2:00 AM GMT+0300

In the millions of words written about Europe’s debt crisis, Germany is typically cast as the responsible adult and Greece as the profligate child. Prudent Germany, the narrative goes, is loath to bail out freeloading Greece, which borrowed more than it could afford and now must suffer the consequences.

Would it surprise you to know that Europe’s taxpayers have provided as much financial support to Germany as they have to Greece? An examination of European money flows and central-bank balance sheets suggests this is so.

Let’s begin with the observation that irresponsible borrowers can’t exist without irresponsible lenders. Germany’s banks were Greece’s enablers. Thanks partly to lax regulation, German banks built up precarious exposures to Europe’s peripheral countries in the years before the crisis. By December 2009, according to the Bank for International Settlements, German banks had amassed claims of $704 billion on Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, much more than the German banks’ aggregate capital. In other words, they lent more than they could afford.

When the European Union and the European Central Bank stepped in to bail out the struggling countries, they made it possible for German banks to bring their money home. As a result, they bailed out Germany’s banks as well as the taxpayers who might otherwise have had to support those banks if the loans weren’t repaid. Unlike much of the aid provided to Greece, the support to Germany’s banks happened automatically, as a function of the currency union’s structure.

How It Worked

Here’s how it worked. When German banks pulled money out of Greece, the other national central banks of the euro area collectively offset the outflow with loans to the Greek central bank. These loans appeared on the balance sheet of the Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, as claims on the rest of the euro area. This mechanism, designed to keep the currency area’s accounts in balance, made it easier for the German banks to exit their positions.

Now for the tricky part: As opposed to the claims of the private banks, the Bundesbank’s claims were only partly the responsibility of Germany. If Greece reneged on its debt, the losses would be shared among all euro-area countries, according to their shareholding in the ECB. Germany’s stake would be about 28 percent. In short, over the last couple of years, much of the risk sitting on German banks’ balance sheets shifted to the taxpayers of the entire currency union.

It’s hard to quantify exactly how much Germany has benefited from its European bailout. One indicator would be the amount German banks pulled out of other euro-area countries since the crisis began. According to the BIS, they yanked $353 billion from December 2009 to the end of 2011 (the latest data available). Another would be the increase in the Bundesbank’s claims on other euro-area central banks. That amounts to 466 billion euros ($590 billion) from December 2009 through April 2012, though it would also reflect non-German depositors moving their money into German banks.

By comparison, Greece has received a total of about 340 billion euros in official loans to recapitalize its banks, replace fleeing capital, restructure its debts and help its government make ends meet. Only about 15 billion euros of that has come directly from Germany. The rest is all from the ECB, the EU and the International Monetary Fund.

Better Prepared

Germany’s changing financial exposure has major implications for its role as a leader of Europe’s response to the crisis. Before Germany’s banks pulled back their funds, they stood to lose a ton of money if Greece left the euro. Now any losses will be shared with the taxpayers of the entire euro area -- particularly France, whose banks still have a lot of outstanding loans to Greece. Perhaps this is what some German officials mean when they say that the euro area is better prepared for a Greek exit.

Ultimately, though, the cost of letting Greece go would come home to Germany. If bank runs and market turmoil forced Portugal, Spain, Italy and others out of the euro area as well, the losses could wipe out much of the capital of German banks. Not to mention the longer-term damage the euro breakup would do to the exports that drive Germany’s economy, and the potential demise of a European project designed to prevent a repeat of the horrors of two world wars.

To prevent such an outcome, with or without Greece, Germany will have to do everything it has so far refused, and more. This would include allowing the ECB to stand behind the debt of sovereigns. The euro area also needs a mechanism that would transfer money to economically troubled countries just as automatically as the region’s payment system bailed out Germany -- an element economists have long said is crucial to making the euro area a workable currency union. As we have advocated, a joint unemployment insurance fund could be a first step toward such a fiscal union.

As German Chancellor Angela Merkel considers the next step in the euro crisis -- one that could help the euro area return to growth or, alternatively, risk the survival of the entire currency union -- she should keep in mind that her country is indebted to the euro system as much as Greece is.

Read more opinion online from Bloomberg View. Subscribe to receive a daily e-mail highlighting new View columns, editorials and op-ed articles.

Today’s highlights: the View editors on the problems with the Facebook IPO; Clive Crook onEurope at the brink; Jonathan Alter on political substance and slander; Ezra Klein on the fight over Bain; Caroline Baum on overregulating banks; Tobias Moskowitz on data-driven policy; Panagis Vourloumis on Greek shock therapy; Junheng Li on China’s economic misinformation.

To contact the Bloomberg View editorial board: view@bloomberg.net.

source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-23/merkel-should-know-her-country-has-been-bailed-out-too.html